The Peloponnesian War

One of the best history books I've ever read. Clear, concise explanations of the causes, politics, military strategies, outcomes and consequences of the Peloponnesian conflict, the book is pitched just right for the interested student of ancient Greek warfare but without the requirement to be a military or historical scholar. Extremely enjoyable and informative.

Excellent account of the Peloponnesian War. Engaging and thoughtful.

出版されてから時間は経つが、このような本がベスト・セラーの一角を占めていたということは、いかに米国の知的レベルが高いかということを象徴している。無論、米国でも、この本を購入し、読んでいる人の多くは中間層以上の人々であろう。だが、ゲームの攻略本や安っぽい新書、漫画を基にしたビジネス書しか売れない国とは大いに知的レベルが異なっていることを示しているのが、本書の存在である。 興味深いのが、ペリクレスやアルキダモスといったアテナイ、スパルタの指導者が、いかにして戦争を回避しようとしていたことを強調している点である。これは、Ｄ・ケーガンの著名なペロポネソス戦争に関する四部作の一作目でも強調されていることではあるが、改めて著者の洞察力を痛感する。とりわけ、国内政治と国際政治が、それらの指導者の意思決定にどのような影響したのかという議論は、非常に興味深い。ケーガンの議論は、限られた資料の中で、歴史家がいかに自己の主張を行うという見本を提示していると言える。 トゥキュディデスの『戦史』は、今日の西欧でも一般教養の一つとして確固たる地位を築いている。一次資料とも言える『戦史』や、今日の歴史家が書いたペロポネソス戦争に関する文献を読むことは、西欧の文明及びその起源を理解する上での絶対条件であると言えよう。 しかし、知的退廃が著しい現在の日本において、それらの著作を手にし、挑戦しようとする人物は少ないであろう。教養どころか、世界的な常識や学問的な興味でさえ失いつつある日本人にとって、このような本は異次元の存在であるかもしれない。

A fine book by an acknowledged expert in the field. It is a pity that my copy from Amazon should have arrived damaged. The packaging itself was intact and the delivery was, as usual, exemplary. The damage occurred when the book was shoved (no doubt at speed) into the otherwise excellent packaging. However, I'm reluctant to criticize the staff member who packed this and the other book that arrived in the same package as I know that there is a premium on speed with Amazon. But if I buy something new, I expect it to arrive new. Then again, maybe Amazon is just responding to its customers who seem to be ever more impatient. Maybe it is us, the customers, who need to be a little less impatient?

Soldiers of Salamis is a novel by Javier Cercas. The title conveys a central theme. The Battle of Salamis, between the Greek and Persian navies, took place in 480 BC. To all too many of today’s Spaniards, the events of their own Civil War, of which a few participants are still living, are as remote as those that occurred at Salamis. The Peloponnesian War commenced a half century after the Battle of Salamis. It would also be a Civil War, Greek upon Greek. It was a war that I knew little about, but would feel comfortable using as a metaphor for wars of long ago, even though some of the participants of those wars were still living. I knew that it was a war between Athens and Sparta, but I was not even sure who won. (And how many Americans know who won the Spanish Civil War?) Donald Kagan’s book (finally!) ended the darkness of not knowing about one of the best documented of ancient conflicts, and a prototype for so many subsequent ones. He has produced a very well-written dense, scholarly work that relies on several ancient texts, most notably one written by a participant, Thucydides. He brings a modern sense of judgment to the historical record, balancing what is written with the most likely scenarios possible, based on his overall knowledge of this time period. There are 29 excellent maps, spaced appropriately throughout the book, that provide the visual basis for understanding the narrative of the battles, and geopolitical landscape. Athens and Sparta. A long term rivalry. Two rather different systems of government, with the Athenians famously having a democratic form. Both had united to beat the Persians, a half century earlier. Neither really wanted war, fearful of the expense and consequences. But entangling alliances, and some “damnable conflict in the Balkans” which were the motive forces that commenced the First World War were operative in commencing the Peloponnesian one also. Athens was the naval superpower of the time, dominating (in general) the sea. Sparta was the land power, and could simple march into the Athenian territory of Attica at the beginning of the war, and start devastating their farms and agriculture. The war raged over the entirety of modern day Greece, the islands in the Aegean Sea, the western coast of modern day Turkey, including the two straits leading to the Black Sea, as well as the coast of southern Italy and Sicily. The war would last for almost three decades, with one significant truce of several years that was frequently violated. Athens had its sea-based empire; Sparta had numerous land-based allies, such as Corinth and Thebes. Athens and Sparta both experienced revolts in their empires. Cities would change sides. Each side also experienced class conflicts, essentially the eternal ones, between the elites and the plebs. And naturally the elites themselves had many a conflict, as egos jockeyed for power. Most impressively, somehow Donald Kagan makes these complex events of almost two and a half millennium ago understandable to the modern reader, by identifying five or ten key causative factors to significant events, and then providing balanced, reasonable judgments. A small sampling of what I learned. The fighting in Sicily was a disaster for Athens. It was initiated by a bluff that was called; the Athenian leader did NOT want to go there… thought he would overestimate what was required, and his bluff was called, not once, but twice, when he asked for reinforcement. The defeat in Sicily should have been the KO punch for Athens, but the war dragged on for another decade. Both sides ran to their former adversary, the Persian Empire, and sought aid and an alliance; rather amazing for two city-states proclaiming the importance of Greek independence. Alcibiades was one slippery character. He was Athenian, went over to the side of Sparta, cuckolded Sparta’s king, then ingratiated himself with Cyrus, the 17 year old son of King Darius of Persia, and made himself out to be the critical and decisive factor behind the great Athenian navel victory at Cyzicus. And as the dragged on, the savagery, brutality, and atrocities increased, which included the execution of their own generals and leaders. And there was much that I did not learn, but certainly do not fault Kagan for it. He covered well enough complex material. How, for example, given the difficulty in transportation, and with only rudimentary hand-tools, and a population devastated by war and the plague, was Athens (as well as Sparta) able to build (and maintain) so many triremes. Athens was dependent on wheat from the Black Sea area. Where exactly, and what were the terms of trade. And why was Sparta not? Finally, the time-worn adage that history is written by the winners appears NOT to be true about the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides was an Athenian, and they were the losers…at least for a while. 6-stars for Kagan’s excellent account.