How Carriers Fought: Carrier Operations in WWII

Okay so where to begin with this book? Beyond the numerous typos in the text and the strenuous need for an editor to have reigned in some of the fluff in this text. I mean there was a whole chapter dedicated to long range bombers crews wearing their gear and about 25% of that chapter was on smoking. Wait...what does any of that have to do with carrier forces fighting in WW2?Okay moving on from there, although the author has a huge bibliography. There are no footnotes, or references to any analysis, conclusions or statements made to back up the texts based on what he "researched". That is just the 1st half of the book. I mean I quit taking notes on my kindle about incredulous analysis after about the 1st quarter of the book when my notes and highlights topped out at 90 with most being "based on what reference?????" Sort of comments. In addition if you read the author admits to using Wikipedia and some other home brewed military systems research websites of questionable data to draw his conclusions.Again that is just the 1st half of the book about supposedly the aircraft, electronics, weapons, and some tactics.The 2nd half of the book is coverage of the major carrier actions of WW2. However, even here if you read his preface (where he admits to pulling some blog posts to make this book) he mentions that he would only cover carrier vs carrier action. So okay he glosses over the early RN operations but then spends about ten pages covering Operation Pedestal, the convoy ops to Malta in early 42. Well that is land based air and German subs vs the RN. At the same time he ignores the USN carrier raids post Pearl Harbor and spends a large amount of time with how the raid happened. Going into the Midway battle he repeats the myths of the battle that IJN was rearming when the bombers struck and even though he appears to reference "Shattered Sword" that dispelled that myth the author keeps it.Going further into the 3rd section, the author appears to do operational analysis, but glosses over what he uses to do the math and what game modeling he uses to create the metrics he reports. Which means to anyone looking to reevaluate this or refute it is unable to repeat the analysis, a major no-no in this sort of thing.The 4th section the author spends a huge amount of time talking about carrier design and development and manufacturing with at times paragraphs that directly contradict the paragraph after or the paragraph before. Let alone he does this analysis without explaining how ship building technology matured during WW2 and evolved from rivets to arc welding and other welding equipment.I could go on with the mis-steps and the mistakes, but short version is that the author appears to have attempted a serious analysis of carrier battles with just looking at timelines and applications of what resources were available to the on scene commanders. Basically, a high level view without the gritty of airplane flown by pilot X did event Y or the bomb hit at time X was fought by damage control team Y.Yet, in my view the author fails because he doesn't effectively footnote anything, the analysis he does do appears to be personal biases (there is a constant thread of why the VT fuze was bad thru the book), and ultimately the typos or contradictions in paragraphs right next to each other seems to show that this is not effective or done in any well manner. I would not recommend this for anyone looking for good data or views on carrier battles.

I was hoping that this book would be more than just another re-hash of Carrier Battles, and I am happy to say that it is exactly what I was looking for. It covers a wide range of operations and strategies; including the types of fighters and bombs and when their strengths and weaknesses against various targets, carrier defense, searching, fighter direction, task force deployment, and technologies and their impacts. The book then summarizes several carrier battles and provides an analysis on how each side did.Therre is a lot of details in this book that aren't in other WW2 carrier books that focus on battle and commanders (which are great also).Overall, highly recommended!

I have found nothing close to presenting so much interesting and useful information in one such readable book. Ship and airplane design history; tactics; logistics, especially the shortage of fleet oilers and ammunition resupply at sea; the problems of finding each other before radar; the changes as airplanes got better. For all this, the book gets 5 stars, and you should get the book too. I am sure there are books with far more in-depth analysis, but this book has enough to get you started, and few will want more.A third if the book is less useful (but does not detract from the useful 2/3) -- his own form of combat modeling. It is not at all clear where this comes from, whether he has distilled other books, or whether he is his own primary source. Two aspects in particular make me wonder.At one point, discussing fighters trying to shoot down bombers with a tail gunner, he says the best way is to "pick off" the tail gunner and close in for the kill. First off, fighter combat does not seem like something where you have time to "pick off" any target, and if you could, why not "pick off" the pilot instead of the tail gunner? Or the engine, or fuel tanks, or whatever part you are in the mood for that morning? Obviously I have never been a WW II fighter pilot, but this "picking off" idea just doesn't pass my smell test.Second, he thinks the US 5"/38 was a terrible choice for an AA weapon, saying they should all have been replaced by an equal weight of quad 40mm Bofors. I have read nothing but praise for the 5"/38 and its director (Mk 37, I believe). This is the first time I have heard any such replacement suggestion. The 40mm was great, but everything else I have read suggests that it was hard pressed to defeat kamikazes near the end of the war. I'd really like to know where this idea comes from, have some more backing for it and not just this one book based on his statistics and comparisons.

I’ve read several books on carrier warfare which have dealt mainly with particular battles or campaigns. This book deal with the basic doctrine of carrier operations and I found it very informative. Other books condemn, say, Nagumo at Midway, without suggesting what else he could have done instead. General criticism of his actions refer to his inadequate search programme, without stating that the IJN had had no previous need to do anything differently. After reading this book it is obvious that he could have placed some ships, of which many were available, sufficiently in distance between his carriers and any threat from the US Navy to cover his flank. Other glaring faults become obvious too, such as those of the captain of HMS Glorious early in the war. This was also interesting personally as an older cousin was engaged to one of the crew, whom I had met, who did not, regrettably, survive.

I quite enjoyed this book despite its large number of flaws. Prominent amongst these are: a chaotic lower-level structure; weak transitions; a lack of focus on the subject at hand; and much repetition. The book would benefit from a thorough revision. The strengths: generally sound analysis; a good selection of photographs; extensive coverage of the complexities in putting a deck-load strike into the air; some rare coverage of subjects such as carrier navigation aids; and good explanation of the outcomes of carrier-on-carrier battles. And the author deserves much credit for finding a niche and filling it competently. Who might particularly enjoy this, beyond naval aviators? I would suggest naval gunners, operations analysts, and any civilian operations managers with a passing interest in aviation.

So much information density in this book, it really is an eye opener even if you have already read a lot of books on carrier or pacific warfare

Este libro representa una de las tendencias recientes de la historiografía que no solo se limita a contar qué sucedió y el porqué, sino también el cómo, lo cual contribuye mucho a responder bien a las dos preguntas anteriores. Para su lectura es recomendable haber leído antes algo acerca de los combates que menciona - recomendable es este sentido "La Guerra Naval en el Pacífico" de Luis Sierra -, con esa base este libro es muy provechoso. El único punto negativo es la tercera parte de la obra, que es más especulativa que analítica, y hasta cierto punto da la impresión de ser "de relleno".

Great book for the technical aspects of carrier aviation. I especially like the comparison of IJN, RN and USN operations and construction priorities in the run-up OT and during the war. Lays bare how once a design ethos is instilled, it takes years to re-tool, if re-tooling, if it is even possible (ie the Japanese emphasis on keeping planes light and using manpower instead of tractors on the flight deck perhaps contributing to a design emphasis on lightly-armoured planes throughout the war when the trend was the opposite).