The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East

Abraham Rabinovich's "The Yom Kippur War" is the counterpart to Michael B. Oren's "Six Days of War" as the definitive books covering those two Middle East conflicts. Anybody wanting to cover the period between 1967-1973 and the two conflicts which bookmark that timeline will not need any other sources than the works by Rabinovich and Oren.We continue to live with the consequences of the 1967 War because it reshaped the map of the Middle East such that it persists today; Israel is in control of the West Bank (Judea/Samaria), the Golan Heights, and the Gaza Strip. The 1967 War showed Arab states that Israel was not just some agrarian entity whose demise was imminent. The 1973 War showed that military force was not an option in restoring whatever balance the Arab states demanded (hence Sadat's peace overtures leading to the 1979 Peace Treaty with Israel). Perhaps because the 1973 Yom Kippur War did not re-shape the Middle East map and did not involve as decisive a decision as the 1967 conflict, it has tended to be overlooked versus the earlier war. But the 1973 War in certain aspects was more important than the Six Days War in that it allowed the first semblance of peace making in the region. That model -- land for peace -- continues to be the operative mode even today and the major thrust of U.S. foreign policy in the region.Like Oren, Rabinovich covers all of the facets of the war: the Israeli and American and Arab political scenes; the military tactics employed; the different battlegrounds (Sinai and Golan Heights); the personalities (Kissinger, Sadat, Meir, Dayan, Elazar, Sharon, Nixon); the international dimensions (the U.N., the Arab bloc, the Soviet Union). Rabinovich does an excellent job in presenting facts as facts and opinions as opinions. Regardless of one's opinion on the politics of the Middle East, Rabinovich's book -- just like Oren's -- can be utilized by anybody regardless of their political persuasions on the Israeli-Arab conflict.The book goes into enough depth on many of the secondary characters from both the Israeli (Kalahani, Eitan, Ben-Gal, Elazar, Adan, Gonen, Zeira) and Egyptian side (Suleiman, Shazly, Ismail). Don't worry if you don't recognize those names -- by the end of the book, you will know them intimately. The international shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger is also covered very well, as is the effects of the Watergate crisis on the Nixon presidency as it impacts both the president and his staff in little-known crisis decision-making instances. The book does not focus as much on outside state actors -- the Soviets and other Arab states -- as much as Oren's book does, but it does not suffer for this lacking. Like Oren, Rabinovich has relied on extensive oral interviews with many of the key players -- there is no substitute for asking the major participants directly what they were thinking and doing, rather than relying on second-hand accounts via newspapers, books, so-called expert analyses, etc.The author goes into enough detail that you can see the panic that hit many of the Israeli military and political upper echelon during the first 72 hours -- Dayan's famous "Third Temple" cry -- but it is accurately put into context behind the stabilizing of the more precarious Northern front against Syria (whose proximity to Israel proper was the main problem, not the size or thrust of her armies). On the Southern command, the fact remains that Israel had virtually the entire Sinai to fall back on, if Egypt intended to go on the offensive (which they would not do until the close of the conflict when Israel had the upper hand strategically). Rabinovich outlines all the key military decision makers and puts their decision-making into the relevant tactical, strategic, and political dynamics as they occurred in real time. Instead of simply second-guessing commanders 30 years after the fact -- how could he make THAT decision? -- we learn that military tactics involves making split-second decisions, often on the basis of partial information and intelligence, often tempered by political or geopolitical necessities. It's not unlike watching a baseball hitter swing though a straight and fast 95 mile-per-hour fastball on TV and saying how could he miss that -- it was right over the plate? -- and then trying to actually go into a batting cage and hit a pitch 10-15 MPH slower. Not too easy! Similarly, it's alot easier to engage in Monday morning quarterbacking when military decisions can be criticized with 30 years of hindsight.The flaws in the Israeli military's tactics -- from the reliance on the thinly-manned Bar-Lev forts, to the changing air tactical strategies -- is thoroughly dissected. At the same time, the actions of individuals who acted on the fly and adapted to the changing military situation (like Ariel Sharon) are pointed out. It becomes evident in reading a thorough analysis of such a short conflict -- longer books on wars usually focus on multi-year campaigns, not shorter battles -- that the winner in wars are not at all those who plan ahead properly, guess correctly, or have 100% foresight. No, the winner is usually the side that makes the least mistakes. In other words, any review of the winning side in a conflict -- whether the Yom Kippur War, World War II, or the Iraq War -- will find lots of military mistakes by both commanders and politicians. But Rabinovich shows that these are not correctible mistakes by flawed military commanders, but rather the necessary price one learns to live with when complex decisions are made by fallible human beings. In baseball, you are considered a good hitter if you can get a hit 30% of the time -- which means you fail 70% of the time. Ted Williams, the greatest hitter of our generation, made out almost 60% of the time in his stellar 1941 season when he batted .406. Similarly, in war, if you can avoid fatal or catastrophic errors, you can often rely on your inherent numerical or quantitative or strategic advantages to hold long enough for your enemy to make the fatal mistakes that doom his side. This is what Israel saw happen once it held off the (near-fatal) errors of intelligence and defensive planning (the Bar-Lev Line) during the first 72-96 hours of the war."The Yom Kippur War" is so exhaustingly detailed on all of the major factors impacting the conflict that a book of this scope could only be written on the 30th anniversary of the War. Many documents have only recently been declassified, the author has painstakingly interviewed many of the major players, and time has allowed many of the decisions to be seen in their proper light. Ariel Sharon comes out particularly well, as opposed to the revisionist Israeli leftist claims that he was a rogue cowboy (where have we heard THAT before?).This book is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED for anyone who wants to study the Yom Kippur War in depth or just read one book on the subject. Other books have covered other subjects or elements of the war more exhaustively (Walter Boyne's "The Two O'Clock War" covering the airlift comes to mind) but you will not find a more comprehensive account of the 1973 conflict than Rabinovich's book. An outstanding historical analysis that is the current de facto standard bearer in its field -- and probably will remain so for many years to come.

FACT IS STRANGER THAN FICTION. An astonishing DAVID versus GOLIATH tale, but amazingly enough, the actual crisis and hostilities happened. Descriptive dynamic portrayal of the key individuals/events/battles involved in the surprise October 1973 conflict. In response to two divergent aggressors on separate combat fronts, the Israeli high command leaders divulged their true individual colors -- some steeped in arrogant denial, and others, proved their effectiveness by fighting relentlessly against all odds of numbers, equipment, tactics. The upper command, unfortunately, suffered collectively, from an extreme "dereliction of duty," which frivolously expended countless lives. A magnificent glimpse of the perseverance/duty/honor of the besieged fighting Israeli soldiers. As succinctly concluded: "Given the strategic, operational, and psychological dimensions of the Arab surprise, Israel's recovery from the edge of the abyss was epic" (p. 553). Intense, moving, inspirational. Highly recommend.

Abraham Rabinovich’s “The Yom Kippur War” is a solid, essentially journalistic account of the 1973 war. It gives a detailed account of the pre-war failures of the Israeli general staff to respond to intelligence regarding Arab plans for invasion, and provides an easily-readable review of the war itself. However, the paucity of maps and charts makes it difficult at times to know just where battles occurred, who was involved, and what the relation of the various events was. Further, while providing a overview of Israeli strategy, the lack of information regarding such non-trivial matters as tactics and weaponry often makes the account more impressionistic than specific. Still, I’d recommend it to anyone interested in this pivotal conflict.

I really liked this book. Rabinovich doesn't spend a lot of time on what led up to the war but he points out in great detail how the Israelis completely underestimated both the Egyptians and the Syrians, and especially the tactics of the Egyptians. He fully points out how the Egyptians learned from the '67 war and how they stuck to their plan until the last few days of the war. Israel, on the other hand, never seemed to realize the impact light infantry anti-tank weapons could have before the war started, only to realize it to devastating effect in the early days of the war. Similarly, they failed to understand the impact newer and more modern surface to air missiles (SAMs) could pose to their air force--again, to their detriment.Rabinovich does an excellent job demonstrating the impact that the frontline soldier had on this war--it wasn't superior general or tactics that won this war--it was the frontline soldier who learned very quickly how to adapt to the new threats posed to them. In addition, Rabinovich clearly demonstrates that the IDF officer corps leads from the front, clear up to Brigade level with many brigade commanders killed or wounded in the fighting.Rabinovich also shows how Anwar Sadat seemingly manipulated the Soviets and how US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger suddenly realized Sadat's overall goal--and then took advantage of it to both conclude the peace and also gain American influence among the region.In addition, Rabinovich includes a segment for "the aftermath" in which he demonstrates the lessons Israel learned regarding Soviet-made SAMs. In Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon, Israel used what they learned from these SAMs to devastating effect on the Syrian air force--to the complete shock of the Soviets.The only thing that I would have liked to see was some kind of Order of Battle for the Israeli army. Rabinovich describes the individual soldiers and junior officers by name and rank, and it's very easy to lose track of who's battalion (for example) so and so led. Other than that, an excellent history of the war.

Em alguns momentos a leitura não é fluida, pois o autor se detém em detalhes de batalhas de tanques. Eventualmente as descrições destas batalhas poderiam ser facilitadas com a inserção de mapas. De toda forma é extremamente interessante ler os detalhes do processo de cessar fogo e desdobramentos políticos. É notável ler o livro e observar as relações atuais de Israel com vários países árabes.

Bought this after watching the TV series "Valley of Tears". Wanted to learn more about this conflict.What an absolutely compelling story and such a well written book. You'll have a hard time putting it down, even if it is 600+ pages.One of the best military books I've ever read. Highly recommend.

This military and political history of the Yom Kippur War is stunning. A masterpiece. Best history of the Yom Kippur war ever written. Gives a compelling and very interesting account of all aspects of the war on the Golan Heights and the Suez Canal. It is clear, well written , riveting and gives a great insight into all the major political and military events of the war. It is the best military history book of any conflict i have ever read. If you are interested in the conflicts between Israel and the Arab states and the Middle East then buy it. Provides great details of the intelligence Israel received warning them of the coming war and why the military chiefs ignored this intelligence and how unprepared Israel was for the war on 2 fronts against Syria and Egypt. I gained a lot of understanding to the background of the war and the detailed operations involved in the fighting on 2 fronts. Also demonstrated Israel,s battlefield recovery and and its will to survive and live and the capacity of the Israeli military to improvise in the chaos of battle and war. In a word brilliant.

Eine exzellente Kombination aus fesselnde Sprache und kluger Analyse.Verständlich und mit beeindruckend tiefgründiger Recherche schildert Abraham Rabinovich, wie es den ISR Streitkräften gelingt, trotz strategischer Überraschung an zwei Fronten, deutlicher quantitativer Überlegenheit der arabischen Angreifer und unerwartetem Wandel des Kriegsbildes (massiver Einsatz von Boden-Boden und Boden-Luft LFK) den Gegner zu stoppen in innerhalb von zwei Wochen zum erfolgreichen Gegenangriff überzugehen.Detaillierte, aber nie langatmige, Berichte aus der strategischen Ebene, den operativen Kommandos bis hin zum einzelnen Soldaten zeigen ein Bild von Motivation und Opferbereitschaft vor allem aber auch des Improvistationstalentes der ISR Streitkräfte.Der Autor behält jederzeit eine übersichtliche Struktur in seiner Darstellung und fügt die vielen losen Ende der großen Fülle des Stoffs sehr gut nachvollziehbar in einer stimmigen Erzählung zusammen.

This book is very interesting and full of details. I suggest it