Hell to Pay: Operation DOWNFALL and the Invasion of Japan, 1945-1947

The author D. M. Giangreco lays out the history with comprehensive footnotes as to sources. Long story short: The anti-bomb crowd relies on data from no later than late July 1945 (and some much earlier) all of which was gleaned from aerial reconnaissance and decoded messages then subjected to "analysis" (educated guessing). The result is that the remaining defensive strength of the Imperial Japanese ground, air and naval capabilities were grossly underestimated. In July 1945 Future Physics Nobel Prize Winner William Shockley used this same data the anti-Bomber used in a report for the War Department that concluded that the total American casualties would be 1.7M to 4M with 400k to 800k deaths for the two-pronged Operation Downfall as well as 10M Japanese. Giangreco delves into the data from the Operation Blacklist interviews and detective work compiled after the Occupation. From this on the ground data not compromised by the uncertainties of aerial reconnaissance and decoding it becomes clear that Mr. Shockley's report was indeed the work of a genius possessed of great insight.

Dropping the bomb on Japan ended World War II while creating an endless discussion about the necessity of dropping the bomb. This discussion creates a lot of heat and noise while never able to reach a definitive conclusion. In 1945, there is no question that Japan is beaten. The question is will the war end with Japan occupied or with a 1918 style surrender? For both governments, the answer is clear. America is not going to repeat 1918 in the Pacific and take the chance of another war in 20 years. Japan looks to extend the war, create causalities and hope America changed its' mind.This book looks at the planning, logistics and possible causalities of an invading Japan. The alternates of naval blockade and continued conventional bombing are covered. Each of these had real problems and very little chance of success by 1947. This wide-ranging study looks at the manpower problem America was starting to experience and war weariness. In 1944 and 1945, American took almost one million causalities defeating Germany and driving Japan back to the home islands. In June 1945, selective service deferments are tightened as America started to train the one million replacements needed for the invasion of Japan.This is a chilling read! We are discussion deaths in the millions with five to ten million more injured. The author shows how Japan was preparing to inflict the maximum damage on the invading force. The conversion of Japanese into axillaries forces, air force training units into combat units and construction of national redoubts chills the reader. American is considering using poison gas and all A-Bombs as tactical weapons. The author walks a tightrope between best case and worst case. In either event, it would have extended the war 12 to 24 months while creating millions of causalities.My Dad, Uncle Jim and Uncle John were in Europe. My wife's Uncle Frank was in a training unit; her Uncle Albert was in the Philippines and her Uncle Arthur was in Europe. My Uncle Kermit had two children and a farmer's deferment. Reading this book, I could not help but think how many of them would have died invading Japan.

The morality of the U.S. use of atomic weapons to end World War Two has been argued about since news of the destruction of the two Japanese cities was reported. In the current atmosphere of revisionist history this event and the men who decided to perform it have been castigated and defamed. This book sets the record of events leading up to that decision straight and provides the primary source material to show how the bombs came to be dropped. It also takes a very close look at events that did happen after the war ended (such as weather) and others that did not but might have (such as the assault landings on the Japanese Home Islands). The author describes how that informtion is important and how it would have affect the conflict in Japan. He quotes extensively from sources on both sides of the war. It is amazing to me that our current intellectuals have been so critical of American leaders who publically stated their remorse over the destruction of innocent human life in the form of citizens of a nation we were at war with, while giving a pass to the leaders of that nation who were entirely willing to sacrifice 20,000,000 of their own civilians to get a better deal in the treaty to end the war.Every poorly constructed arguement of the revisionists is demolished with facts. No the Japanese military leadership was not about to surrender. No the invasion would not have been a walk over. No the horrific casualty projections were not made up after the war as a post facto justification for using the atomic weapons. Yes the civilians in Japan would have suffered even more in the event of a long drawn out blockage or even worse if the invasions had go in.Nowhere in revisionist history have I seen mention of the massive humanitarian aid that the USA intended upon supplying in the areas of occupation immediately upon controlling those areas, but detailed information on those efforts is here. We were allocating and transporting food and medical supplies into a war zone for the citizens of the nation that had attacked us, a nation that killed millions of Chinese for purely economic gain.This book should not only be read, it should be quoted, discussed and distributed. Well worth a read if you beleive that the use of the atomic weapons was justified. If you do not believe so read this book and its included references with an open mind and see if you still hold the position afterwards.

The author provides a detailed description of what would be the invasion of Japan after Okinawa battles and the plans by which the allies generals were planning the invasion of the main islands of Japan. He provides detailed plans, death toll estimates and shows that war is a complex subject that cannot be only analyzed under simplistic views. I suggest the book to every political science student as a example of what realpolitik means.

Als im August 1945 erstmals Nuklearwaffen eingesetzt wurden, verursachte dies in den Vereinigten Staaten keinen Aufschrei der Empörung. Alle hofften, vom Präsidenten bis zum einfachen Soldaten, dass das Japanische Kaiserreich nun endlich bedingungslos kapitulieren und die Waffen niederlegen würde.Heute wird dagegen oft die Meinung vertreten, dass sich der damalige Einsatz der Atomwaffen nicht mehr rechtfertigen lässt. Japan sei ohnehin besiegt gewesen, so dass der Abwurf von zwei Atombomben auf zivile Ziele moralisch verwerflich und militärisch sinnlos gewesen wäre.Das eine solche Ansicht sachlich falsch und zudem völlig ahistorisch ist, arbeitet der Militärhistoriker D. M. Giangreco in dieser Studie überzeugend heraus. Hierzu untersucht er sehr gründlich die amerikanischen und japanischen Einschätzungen und Planungen über den zu erwartenden Kriegsverlauf. Mittels einer umfassenden Quellenbasis analysiert er die jeweiligen Vorbereitungen der politischen und militärischen Führungsebenen, die in den Jahren 1944/45 keineswegs von einem schnellen Kriegsende im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum ausgingen.Der Autor geht zunächst auf die amerikanischen Verlusterwartungen näher ein. Die realen Verluste hatten seit dem Sommer 1944 sowohl in Europa als auch in Asien deutlich zugenommen. Besonders besorgniserregend war der fanatische Widerstand der Japaner, die buchstäblich bis zum letzten Mann kämpften. Die Schlachten um Okinawa und Iwojima hatten gezeigt, dass die japanischen Streitkräfte Willens und in der Lage waren, bis zum Äußersten zu gehen, um den Amerikanern möglichst hohe Verluste zuzufügen.Die seit Herbst 1944 von den USA vorangetriebene Bomberoffensive hatte zwar auf den Japanischen Inseln fürchterliche Zerstörungen angerichtet, ohne dass dies jedoch Tokio zur Aufgabe veranlasst hätte. Auch die Seeblockade der U.S. Navy brachte kein rasches Ende der Kampfhandlungen und es war unabsehbar, wann das "Reich der aufgehenden Sonne“ durch solche Maßnahmen zum Einlenken gezwungen werden konnte.Der massive Einsatz von Bodentruppen wurde demnach unausweichlich, wollte man Japan noch innerhalb eines halbwegs überschaubaren Zeitrahmens besiegen. Dabei drohten jedoch Verlustzahlen, welche die von Okinawa noch um ein Vielfaches übertreffen würden. Diese pessimistische Prognose wurde nicht nur in Regierungskreisen vertreten, sondern sie fand selbst bei außenstehenden Persönlichkeiten, zu denen etwa Herbert Hoover gehörte, einen starken Zuspruch und Rückhalt.Japans militärische Führungsspitze ging ihrerseits davon aus, dass der Krieg noch nicht verloren war. Wenn es gelänge, die amerikanischen Streitkräfte auf heimischen Boden abzunutzen, könne man noch einen Waffenstillstand und die Aufnahme von diplomatischen Verhandlungen bewirken. In Tokio herrschte die Annahme vor, dass die amerikanische Bevölkerung kriegsmüde sei und hohe Verluste nicht tolerieren würde. Es käme also nur darauf an, möglichst lange durchzuhalten und den "Yankees“ einen großen Blutzoll abzuringen.Für die Realisierung dieses Ziels mobilisierte man alle Kräfte. Die Landstreitkräfte wurden erheblich aufgestockt, und zwar genau in den Regionen, wo die Amerikaner und ihre Verbündeten Landungsköpfe bilden wollten. Die japanische Luftwaffe, welche von der amerikanischen Seite verfrüht als kaum noch existent eingestuft wurde, bereitete sich auf den Masseneinsatz von Kamikaze-Fliegern vor. Auch Kamikaze-Boote sollten massiert gegen die Landungsschiffe des Feindes eingesetzt werden.In dieses Wespennest beabsichtigten die US-Streitkräfte vorzustoßen. Die Operation "Downfall“ gliederte sich hierbei in zwei Teile: In der Operation "Olympic“, die für den Herbst 1945 vorgesehen war, sollte die südlichste von den vier japanischen Hauptinseln angegriffen werden. Die primäre Intension bestand in der Anlage von Flugplätzen, die als Operationsbasen für Einsätze gegen die Region rund um Tokio genutzt werden konnten.Der Hauptstoß würde mit der Operation "Coronet“ im Frühjahr 1946 erfolgen, der sich gezielt gegen die japanische Hauptstadt und deren Umgebung richten sollte.Im Sommer 1945 häuften sich allerdings Meldungen der amerikanischen Feindaufklärung, die sich sehr besorgt über den enormen japanischen Aufmarsch zur Verteidigung der Heimatinseln äußerten. Sogar General Marshall und sein Stab dachten in ihrer Verzweiflung ernsthaft an den taktischen Einsatz von Atom- und Chemiewaffen, um die japanischen Stellungen auszuschalten.Zum Glück für alle Beteiligten mussten solche Pläne und Vorbereitungen nicht in die Praxis umgesetzt werden. Die Verluste wären auf beiden Seiten mit Sicherheit ungeheuerlich gewesen. Ein derartiger Schrecken ohne Ende konnte letztlich nur durch den strategischen Einsatz der Atombomben abgewendet werden. Die nukleare Eskalation war also keineswegs unnötig, sondern sie war eine unumgängliche Notwendigkeit, die alleine den Krieg auf einen Schlag beenden konnte.Die Kritik von linksliberalen Intellektuellen und revisionistischen Historikern an der angeblich unmoralischen Verwendung der "absoluten Waffe“ läuft daher ins Leere. Giangreco hat dies im Verlauf seines Buches klar aufgezeigt.Dessen ungeachtet müssen noch zwei Punkte kritisch erwähnt werden. Zum einen kommt es in den Kapiteln gelegentlich zu Wiederholungen, die bei einem besseren Lektorat vermeidbar gewesen wären. Zum anderen neigt der Verfasser dazu, sich in den Details der Planungsstäbe zu verlieren. Jeder Plan kommt jedoch beim ersten Feindkontakt an sein Ende, so dass man nicht sagen kann, wie sich die konkreten Kampfhandlungen tatsächlich entwickelt hätten. Giangrecos diesbezügliche Ausführungen bleiben deshalb spekulativ, auch wenn es sich um gut begründete Spekulationen handelt. Davon abgesehen ist die Arbeit von Giangreco aber absolut empfehlenswert.Jürgen Rupp

I highly recommend this book to any one interested in WW2 and the Pacific War - I read the on-line article "OPERATION DOWNFALL :The devil was in the details" a few years ago by the author at the Joint Forces Quarterly - and eagerly read things I never knew about eg the Inundation of the Tokyo Plain and also the example of the Invasion of Leyte Island as an example of over-optimistic planning which took far longer to conquer than anticipated -Leyte is a perfect example. It was to the Luzon campaign what the Kyushu invasion was to the capture of Tokyo, a preliminary operation to create a huge staging area. Today, we can recall MacArthur wading ashore triumphantly in the Philippines. But what Truman and Marshall knew only too well was that MacArthur was supposed to have retaken Leyte with four divisions andhave eight fighter and bomber groups striking from the island within 45 days of the initial landings. Nine divisions and 60 days into the battle,however, only a fraction of that airpower was operational because of unexpected terrain conditions(and this on an island which the United States had occupied for forty years). Nor had fighting on the ground gone as planned. The Japanese even briefly isolated US Fifth Air Force headquarters and also captured much of the Burauen airfield complex.This is just one rare or not known nuggets of information - which I had never heard of( and I read a great deal on WW2 )-the other thing was how hard it was to capture insignificant features of ground from the Japanese and how good their anti-tank guns were , so that the Invasion would have been no walkover .........The operational plan for Operation Coronet called for a swift strike up the Kanto Plain to cut off Tokyo by a pair of US armored divisions from Europe. As a practical matter, however, there was no way to actually conduct the envisioned movement in a timely fashion. Now, long before the British experienced the tragedy of pushing XXX Corps up a single road through the Dutch lowlands to Arnhem, an event popularized through the book and movie A Bridge too Far, US Japan Invasion planners were well aware of the costs that would be incurred if the Kanto Plain was not secured for mobile warfare and airfield construction prior to the wet season. Intensive hydrological and weather studies begun in 1943 made it clear that an invasion in early March offered the best chance of success, with the situation becoming more risky as the month progressed.With good luck, relatively free movement across the plain might even be possible well into April. Unfortunately, this assumed that the snow run-off from the mountains would not be too severe, and that the Japanese would not flood the fields. While subsequent post-war prisoner interrogations did not reveal any plans to systematically deluge low-lying areas, a quick thrust up the Kanto Plain would not have been as speedy as planners believed. First, there were no bridges in the area capable of taking vehicles over 12 tons. Every tank, every self-propelled gun, and prime mover would have to cross bridges erected for the event. Next, logistical considerations and the sequence of follow-up units would require that armored divisions not even land until Y+10. This would provide time for the defenders to observe that the US infantry's generic tank support was severely hampered by already flooded rice fields and- shall we say- suggest ways to make things worse for the invaders.A late start on Honshu would leave American forces to fight their way up flood plains that were only dry during certain times of the year, but could be suddenly inundated by the Japanese. If the timetable slipped for either operation, US soldiers and Marines on Honshu would risk fighting in terrain similar to that later encountered in Vietnam- minus the helicopters to fly over this mess- where all movement was readily visible from even low terrain features and vulnerable convoys moved on roads above rice paddies. Unfortunately, foul weather would have delayed base development on Kyushu and spelled a potentially disastrous late start for the operation on Honshu.anyway VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDEDso very well done Mr Giancreco !

In 1945, the American invasion of Japan was cancelled because the Japanese surrendered. The American high command seems to have believed that it would have been tough, but the Japanese had taken such a beating that it wouldn't have been too terrible. This book digs deeper including analysis of Japanese sources (as opposed to American analyses of Japanese capabilities which throughout the war showed severe over-optimistism), leading to some horrifying conclusions. The Japanese had a very sophisticated plan, knew exactly what was coming, were planning to accept appalling losses perhaps in the tens of millions, and had plenty of troops and equipment including aircraft and fuel held back from the previous fighting. By 1945 the loss rates in island assaults were around 100% for the Japanese defenders, and had gradually reached almost one American casualty for every one to two Japanese dead; combining that with the knowledge that the Japanese had assembled millions of troops backed by civilian militia leads to some sobering arithmetic.In general the various chapters of this book are extremely well written,thorough and persuasive, and both the technical capabilities of the sides and the sheer impending human catastrophe are brought to life very well. It clearly brings to life the terrible situation for all concerned : the American planners who wanted desperately to end the war but faced terrible decisions; the American troops (and navy and air force) facing mass death; the Japanese military and civilians who would have been slaughtered; and the 400,000 people per month (largely civilians) who were dying in Asia at the time of the surrender. This book has a little of everything with chapters on American and Japanese planning and forces; the terrain; Japanese tactics (such as the use of kamikaze aircraft, refined to perfection by this point); even the American plans to supply blood to the battlefield.My one criticism of the book is that while the chapters are generally good, it's hard to discern a clear structure or a theme other than "here's a good analysis of another fascinating but awful aspect of the situation". On the other hand, I certainly found it hard to put down.

The author makes two basic errors. One generic, the other specific. In reverse order.Like so many authors who have painstakingly researched their subject, Giangreco falls into the trap of assuming that his reader is privy to information, particularly that which pertains to the motives of participants, that he him obviously has, but a lay reader simply lacks. I'm no dummy, having studied and read voluminously right across 20th century history, but even I need assistance to discern the various bureaucratic and personality led conflicts, differences of opinion, and institutional prejudices and biases of the protagonists. Instead of illumination, we instead get a veritable artillery barrage of repetition. I'm writing this a quarter into the book, and for most of this section it's been nothing more than ceaseless reiteration of essentially the same story, namely that the loses likely to be encountered by a land assault on Japan would be 'X', that military recruitment in the US would have severe problems in supplying this manpower, and the Japanese in 1945 had built up their defences in Kyushu. Which leads onto the generic failing.This book, like so, so many academic texts, is simply way too long. There is a nice, interesting journal article in this soup, but for reasons of publishing finance, and academic tradition, we are instead treated to a frustratingly watered down, and thus incoherent mess.I started enthused and interested, a quarter way in I'm having real difficulty in carrying on, because I simply don't care anymore.

A great 'what if' book and very revealing about the casualties the US might have sustained (they were not keen to have the allies involved). There is some repetition in this book which gives it the feel of a series of academic articles strung together.